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I.

INTRODUCTION

The disparate impact doctrine emerged to more effectively
remedy the policies and practices that cause or maintain disparities
based on a protected class—even when the discriminatory intent is
not explicit. Unlike individual disparate-treatment claims,
disparate-impact claims more directly address and remedy implicit
bias and discrimination. Although judicial hostility to robust
enforcement of civil rights has diluted the power of the disparate
impact doctrine in recent years, this vital doctrine still offers great
promise to rectify past and ongoing wrongs. The disparate impact
doctrine continues to be an essential tool for accomplishing what
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has eluded the nation to date: wholesale eradication of
discrimination based on a protected class.
This article considers the continuing importance of the
disparate impact doctrine and how it has been severely limited by
extremist interpretation. In Part II, this article introduces the
origins of the disparate impact doctrine, highlighting the reasons
for a progressive application that are as relevant today as when the
1
Supreme Court adopted the doctrine fifty years ago. Part III
discusses the politically orchestrated attacks on the disparate
2
impact doctrine. Part IV analyzes the barriers that judicial activists
have erected against a meaningful application of the disparate
3
impact doctrine. Part V discusses recent positive developments in
the application of the disparate impact doctrine, including the
Supreme Court explicitly recognizing the existence of, and need to
4
remedy, “unconscious prejudice.” This article concludes by calling
for an application of the disparate impact doctrine that returns to
Congress’s manifest intent when it enacted the nation’s leading
civil rights statutes and that comports with the Supreme Court’s
5
clear precedent when it first adopted the doctrine. In this way, the
American Dream can become a reality for everyone, instead of
primarily for the privileged.
II. THE EXPANSION OF CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT THROUGH THE
ADOPTION OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT DOCTRINE (1960S–1970S)
A.

The Enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

The Civil Rights Act of 1964, a landmark development in civil
rights, was enacted to halt the problem of intentional
discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, and/or national
6
origin. The Act, which Congress set forth in eleven sections,
required that voting rights be the same for all people; prevented
access to public facilities from being denied based on race,
religion, or national origin; outlawed discrimination in public

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Section V.A.
See infra Section V.B.
See RAYMOND F. GREGORY, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AND
WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION 1112 (2014).
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places; ended segregation in schools; and outlawed discrimination
7
by employers and government agencies.
Although the Act extended protections to all Americans to
guard everyone from discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex,
religion, or national origin, the law emerged from the long struggle
to eliminate discrimination against African Americans, in
particular. Before President John F. Kennedy proposed the Act to
Congress, he stated to the American public that “[i]t ought to be
possible . . . for every American to enjoy the privileges of being
American without regard to his race or his color” but emphasized
that this was not yet true because of significant disparities between
African Americans and whites in educational achievement,
8
employment prospects, and life expectancy. Although President
Kennedy focused on equal rights for all citizens, the Act emanated
directly from “the social impulse toward political, economic, and
9
dignitary equality for African Americans,” in particular. Moreover,
Title VII of the Act sought to “eliminate workplace discrimination,
the basic cause of the disparities that had developed between
10
African American and white workers.” The history and context of
Title VII’s passage remind us that, although the law seeks to protect
all, Congress specifically enacted the law to end discrimination
11
against African Americans.

7. See Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and
Resurrection of the Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 431, 432 n.10 (2005).
8. John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People
on Civil Rights (June 11, 1963), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9271.
9. See GREGORY, supra note 6, at 9 (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 10.
11. Current anti-discrimination law creates additional challenges of
discrimination at the intersection of protected classes. Because Title VII is framed
to protect individuals from discriminatory employment practices based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin, it essentially forces claimants to “selfidentify using [one of the] established legal categories to situate their claim.”
Bradley Allan Areheart, Intersectionality and Identity: Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII,
17 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 199, 207 (2006). A disparate-impact case that clearly
exemplifies this problem is DaGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Division, 413 F.
Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 558 F.2d 480
(8th Cir. 1977). In DaGraffenreid, black female employees brought a claim against
General Motors under Title VII alleging a seniority system that was discriminatory
towards black women. Id. at 143. The discrimination the women were facing was
not simply a matter of their race or a matter of their gender, but rather the
intersection of both protected classes. Id. The court responded to this claim by
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The legislative history and text of Title VII plainly indicate that
the law targets explicit discrimination, otherwise known as
12
disparate treatment. Congress did not, however, expressly codify a
prohibition against disparate-impact discrimination—that is,
conduct that appears to be nondiscriminatory but nonetheless has
13
a discriminatory effect. As written in 1964, Title VII stated in
section 706(g) that if the “respondent has intentionally engaged in
or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice
charged in the complaint,” the court “may enjoin the respondent
from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
14
such affirmative action as may be appropriate.” Title VII remained
silent as to whether an employer’s facially neutral policy or practice
that resulted in a disproportionate effect on a protected class also
15
constituted illegal discrimination. Title VII’s silence about
disparate-impact claims left the courts to interpret whether
Congress intended for plaintiffs to be able to obtain remedies
concerning “neutral” policies that result in disparities between
members of protected classes and others.

saying that the women were “combin[ing] statutory remedies” and as a result
trying to “create a new ‘super-remedy’ that would give them relief beyond what the
drafters . . . intended.” Id. The court held that the “lawsuit must be examined to
see if it states a cause of action for race discrimination, sex discrimination, or
alternatively either, but not a combination of both.” Id.
Although the court ultimately “dismissed the race-based claim, its
treatment of the sex-based claim illuminate[d] potential intersectional claimants’
precarious legal position.” Areheart, supra, at 199200. While General Motors did
hire white women before Title VII was passed, they did not hire black women until
after Title VII was passed. Id. at 200. A recession occurred later, and because of the
seniority system in place at General Motors, “all of the black women were laid off.”
Id. The court ultimately interpreted these facts as evidence that General Motors
had hired women, and as a result, there was no sex-based discrimination. Id. Using
that same analysis, “even if the DaGraffendreid court had heard the race-based claim
. . . the employer could have disproved it by showing a lack of discrimination
against black men.” Id. at 200–01. The end result is a “catch-22,” where “black
women are only protected to the extent that their experiences coincide with those
of white women or black men.” Id. at 201.
12. See Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII’s Regulatory Regime: Rights,
Theories, and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 427–28 (1995).
13. Id. at 427 (“[T]he statute does not define the term ‘discrimination’ . . .
[and is therefore] uninformative about the role of discriminatory effects . . . .”).
14. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, 261 (1964) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2016)) (emphasis added).
15. See id.
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The Affirmation of the Disparate Impact Doctrine Under Title VII:
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.

The Supreme Court first recognized the disparate impact
doctrine when it interpreted Title VII in the landmark case Griggs
16
v. Duke Power Co. In Griggs, the Court held that Title VII
“proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
17
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.” The Court
explained that the purpose and intent of Title VII were clear:
[A]chieve equality of employment opportunities and
remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group of white employees over other
employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent,
cannot be maintained if they operate to “freeze” the status
18
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.
In other words, the existence of a disparate impact resulting from a
neutral employment policy or practice is sufficient to establish
19
liability under Title VII.
Following Griggs, the “[d]isparate impact theory became an
important tool for addressing more hidden discrimination,” and
“[a]dministrative agencies and the courts began applying disparateimpact analysis to other statutes, including Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Fair Housing Act of 1968, and the Age
20
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.” For instance, in
United States v. City of Black Jack, the Eighth Circuit held that a
zoning ordinance with a racially discriminatory effect violated Title
21
VIII, commonly known as the Fair Housing Act.

16. See 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
17. Id. at 431 (“If an employment practice which operates to exclude
Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited.”)
18. Id. at 429–30.
19. See id.
20. Kristen Galles, The Supreme Court’s Assault on Civil Rights and Access to
Justice, 41 A.B.A. HUM. RTS. 1, 4 (2015).
21. 508 F.2d 1179, 1188 (8th Cir. 1974) (“We hold that Zoning Ordinance
No. 12 of the City of Black Jack violates Title VIII, because it denies persons
housing on the basis of race, in violation of [42 U.S.C. §] 3604(a), and interferes
with the exercise of the right to equal housing opportunity, in violation of
[§] 3617.”).
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C.

A Progressive Application of the Disparate Impact Doctrine in the
Wake of Griggs

Throughout the 1970s, courts consistently and robustly
22
interpreted the disparate impact doctrine as set forth in Griggs.
Through such precedent, the courts clarified and refined the
mechanics of applying the doctrine under an array of
23
circumstances.
The first Supreme Court case addressing the disparate impact
24
doctrine after Griggs was Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody. Albemarle
clarified the burden-shifting framework for the disparate impact
25
doctrine, which Griggs did not directly address. Adding the
burden-shifting framework represented an important development
because “[t]he order and allocation of the burdens of proof on the
parties in a civil action . . . governs the fact-finding process and
factual disputes that lie at the heart of virtually every discrimination
case”; furthermore, burdens of proof have a “significant effect on
the outcome of a case and frequently may be dispositive of which
26
party wins or loses.”
In Albemarle, the Court used the burden-shifting framework
27
outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green for disparate28
treatment cases. Under the burden-shifting methodology, the
plaintiff must first present statistical evidence to demonstrate a
29
prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination. Once the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
employer to show that the policy or practice in question is “job
30
related.” Finally, if the employer demonstrates that the policy or
practice is job-related, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
prove “that the asserted business justification [was] pretext for

22. See ROBERT BELTON, THE CRUSADE FOR EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE: THE
GRIGGS V. DUKE POWER STORY 196 (2014).
23. Id.
24. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
25. See BELTON, supra note 22, at 196.
26. Id.
27. See 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973).
28. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
29. See id. (explaining that a prima facie case of discrimination has been
made when “the tests in question select applicants for hire or promotion in a
racial pattern significantly different from the pool of applicants”).
30. Id.
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31

unlawful discrimination.” A plaintiff can show pretext by, inter
alia, demonstrating the existence of a less-discriminatory
32
alternative.
Albemarle strengthened the disparate impact doctrine because
it placed a greater burden of proof on the defendant. Specifically,
“the burden imposed upon employers under the business necessity
defense was a substantial one—the burden of persuasion—that was
33
difficult to meet in a large number of the disparate-impact cases.”
After Albemarle, the disparate impact doctrine continued to
pick up steam in 1982 when the Supreme Court decided Connecticut
34
v. Teal. In Teal, the employer defended its procedure for
employee promotions that had a disproportionate impact on
35
African Americans. The employer argued that its non-job-related
36
test for promotions should be allowed because the “bottom-line”
result of its “promotional process was an appropriate racial
37
balance.” The Court rejected the employer’s bottom-line rationale
38
in light of Griggs. The Court reasoned that “[i]t is clear beyond
cavil that the obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide an equal
opportunity for each applicant regardless of race, without regard to
31. BELTON, supra note 22, at 197.
32. See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 436.
33. BELTON, supra note 22, at 197.
34. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
35. See id. at 442.
36. “Bottom-line” refers to the type of defense the employer used in this case.
The bottom-line defense focuses on the overall results of a selection procedure
used by an employer. David N. Yellen, The Bottom Line Defense in Title VII Actions:
Supreme Court Rejections in Connecticut v. Teal and a Modified Approach, 68 CORNELL
L. REV. 735, 738 (1983) (“The bottom line defense is applicable when one step in
a multistep hiring or promotion process has a disparate impact on a protected
class but the overall process is nondiscriminatory.”). In Teal, the ultimate results of
the selection procedure used were more favorable to blacks than to whites. See 457
U.S. at 444 (“The overall result of the selection process was that, of the 48
identified black candidates who participated in the selection process, 22.9 percent
were promoted and of the 259 identified white candidates, 13.5 percent were
promoted.”). The employer argued in Teal that the bottom-line result of its
promotion policy should be a complete defense to the suit. Id. However, black
applicants who were disqualified in the first stage were still victims of disparateimpact discrimination, even though black applicants as a whole did better than
white applicants. See id. at 456 (“In sum, petitioners’ nondiscriminatory ‘bottom
line’ is no answer, under the terms of Title VII, to respondents’ prima facie claim
of employment discrimination.”).
37. Teal, 457 U.S. at 442.
38. See id. at 445–51.
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whether members of the applicant’s race are already
39
proportionately represented in the work force.” In other words,
the Court determined that attaining a racially balanced work force
was not a defense to a Title VII violation.
III. THE RETREAT FROM CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT THROUGH THE
DILUTION OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT DOCTRINE (1980S)
A.

The Reagan Administration–Engineered Attack on the Disparate
Impact Doctrine

The political—and, thus, judicial—climate that allowed the
disparate impact doctrine to flourish dramatically changed in the
1980s: with the election of President Reagan, a concerted and
40
expanding attack on the disparate impact doctrine began.
“President Ronald Reagan took office in 1981 during a time when
claims of reverse discrimination were on the rise and affirmative
action was constantly under attack in the political and legal
41
arenas.” During President Reagan’s eight-year tenure, “his
administration conducted a sustained political and legal campaign
to get rid of the disparate impact theory because of the belief that
the disparate treatment theory of discrimination, which requires
proof of discriminatory intent, is the only theory of discrimination
42
that is embraced in our national commitment to equality.”
The Reagan administration wanted to nullify Griggs and
“engaged in an all-out assault on the disparate impact theory and
43
affirmative action.” As part of this attack, the Department of
Justice’s Office of Legal Policy published a report to the Attorney
General that highlighted the purported absence of intent needed
39. Id. at 454–55.
40. BELTON, supra note 22, at 268 (“President Reagan’s election and his
appointment of conservative Justices to the Supreme Court were among the most
important developments that set into motion events that eventually led to the
death of the Griggs disparate impact theory.”).
41. Id.
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 277–78; see also OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: REDEFINING DISCRIMINATION: “DISPARATE
IMPACT” AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1987) [hereinafter
DOJ REDEFINING DISCRIMINATION REPORT] (stating in the Executive Summary that
“if ‘discrimination’ is understood to mean statistically disproportionate effects
alone, the result will be nothing less than the permanent institutionalization of
race- and gender-conscious affirmative action”).
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44

to prevail under the disparate impact doctrine. The report stated
that the only supposedly legitimate concept of discrimination, as
originally interpreted by Congress, required an element of explicit
45
intent or purpose. The report concluded, “[t]he redefinition of
discrimination in civil rights jurisprudence which has been
underway in this country since the early 1970’s is fraught with
46
portentous consequences.” The report also condemned the Griggs
decision, stating that it “marked a tragic turn in American civil
rights jurisprudence, one away from non-discrimination and toward
‘an open contest for social and economic benefits conferred on the
basis of race or other classifications previously thought to be
47
invidious.’”
In addition to constructing and disseminating the Office of
Legal Policy report, the Reagan administration shaped disparateimpact jurisprudence by significantly altering the composition of
48
the Supreme Court. President Reagan first appointed Justice
49
Sandra Day O’Connor in 1981. He then promoted right-wing
Justice William Rehnquist to Chief Justice and appointed right-wing
50
judge Antonin Scalia to Justice Rehnquist’s open seat in 1986.
Two years later, Reagan appointed right-leaning Justice Anthony
51
52
Kennedy to replace centrist Justice Lewis Powell. These
appointments created a right-wing majority and set the stage for
the Supreme Court decisions to come, which ultimately dismantled
53
Griggs and severely weakened the disparate impact doctrine.

44. See DOJ REDEFINING DISCRIMINATION REPORT, supra note 43.
45. See id. at 7 (“Discrimination . . . is deemed culpable precisely because it
results from an intent or purpose . . . .”).
46. Id. at ii.
47. Id. at 156 (quoting Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and
Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1312, 1313 (1986)).
48. George Lovell, Michael McCann & Kirstine Taylor, Covering Legal
Mobilization: A Bottom-Up Analysis of Wards Cove v. Atonio, 41 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 61,
90 (2016).
49. William A. Wines, Title VII Interpretation and Enforcement in the Reagan Years
(1980–89): The Winding Road to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 645,
651 (1994).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 690.
52. Marcy C. Daly, Affirmative Action, Equal Access and the Supreme Court’s 1988
Term: The Rehnquist Court Takes a Sharp Turn to the Right, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1057,
1113 n.232 (1990).
53. See BELTON, supra note 22, at 268.
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The Creation of the Federalist Society and the Resulting Intensification
of the Campaign Against a Progressive Application of the Disparate
Impact Doctrine

The establishment of the Federalist Society in the 1980s
strengthened the Reagan administration’s attack on the disparate
impact doctrine. The Federalist Society consists largely of right54
wing lawyers, law students, and scholars. The organization began
as a student organization at Yale Law School in 1980 and quickly
55
spread to Harvard and the University of Chicago. With powerful
forces supporting the group, the organization became a national
56
organization within two years.
Soon after the organization’s founding, members of the
Federalist Society began to enter key positions of leadership within
the Reagan administration; in fact, the Reagan administration
actively sought out members of the group to work for the
57
administration. President Reagan’s Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, Michael Horowitz, “contacted the
Society’s founding members and began introducing them to key
58
people in the Reagan administration.” Tellingly, several of the
59
founding members of the Federalist Society occupied influential

54. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME
COURT 15 (2007) (discussing the origins of the Federalist Society as a Yale student
organization that intended to “serve as a platform to discuss and advocate
conservative ideas in legal thought”).
55. See id. The University of Chicago chapter’s “founders ‘questioned the
prevailing notion that big government could solve our country’s social, political,
and economic problems,’ according to a chapter history. The students teamed
with conservative professors, including Antonin Scalia, Frank Easterbrook, Richard
Posner, and Richard Epstein to found the organization.” Meredith Heagney, Law
School Federalist Society Chapter to Host National Convention, U. CHI. L. SCH. (Apr. 15,
2014),
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/law-school-federalist-society-chapter
-host -national-convention. See generally Nancy Scherer & Banks Miller, The Federalist
Society’s Influence on the Federal Judiciary, 62 POL. RES. Q. 366 (2009).
56. See generally Scherer & Miller, supra note 55, at 366–78 (discussing the
Federalist Society’s history and analyzing the connection between membership in
the Federalist Society and political views on the bench).
57. See TOOBIN, supra note 54, at 16 (“[T]he Reagan administration began
hiring Federalist members as staffers and, of course, appointing them as judicial
nominees, with Bork and Scalia as the most famous examples.”).
58. Scherer & Miller, supra note 55, at 367.
59. Heagney, supra note 55.
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policy-making positions within the Reagan administration’s Justice
60
Department.
Edwin Meese, a prominent Federalist Society member, served
as Counselor to the President from 1981 to 1985 and as Attorney
61
General from 1985 to 1988. In short order, Attorney General
Meese “began elevating Federalist Society members to positions of
importance in the Reagan Justice Department,” and “[b]y 1986, all
12 of the Assistant Attorneys General in the Justice Department
62
were tied to the Federalist Society.” At one point, “one of the first
Federalist Society members . . . described the Meese DOJ as a
63
‘Federalist Society shop.’”
Attorney General Meese presided over the Department of
Justice precisely when the Office of Legal Policy published the
report entitled Redefining Discrimination: Disparate Impact and the
Institutionalization of Affirmative Action, which targeted disparate
64
impact doctrine’s purported lack of an intent requirement.
Attorney General Meese, however, did not stop there. The
Department of Justice published numerous reports that “informed
the legal and constitutional agenda for conservatives inside and
65
outside the government . . . .” These “reports,” including the one
criticizing the disparate impact doctrine, reflected the Federalist
Society’s views. The Federalist Society has continued up to the
present day with its campaign against the disparate impact
66
doctrine.
Along with infiltrating the Executive Branch, the Federalist
Society secured extensive power within the Judicial Branch during

60. See Scherer & Miller, supra note 55, at 368.
61. See id. at 367.
62. Id.
63. MICHAEL AVERY & DANIELLE MCLAUGHLIN, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 27
(2013).
64. See DOJ REDEFINING DISCRIMINATION REPORT, supra note 43.
65. Id. at 28.
66. See generally Carissa Mulder, The Kudzu of Civil Rights Law: Disparate Impact
Spreads Into Educational “Resource Comparability,” 16 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y
PRAC. GROUPS 7 (2015) (arguing that October 2014 guidance of the U.S.
Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights encourages disparate treatment in
the distribution of school resources through misuse of the disparate impact
doctrine); Roger B. Clegg, OCR’s Testing (Mis)Guidance: Anti-Education, Anti-Civil
Rights, 3 C.R. PRAC. GROUP NEWSL. 3 (2000) (arguing that the U.S. Department of
Education, Office of Civil Rights has misappropriated the disparate impact
doctrine from employment law to standardized tests in higher education).
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the reign of the Reagan administration. Justice Scalia, appointed by
President Reagan to the Supreme Court in 1986, was one of the
67
original Federalist Society faculty advisors. President Reagan also
appointed Frank Easterbrook and Richard Posner to the Seventh
Circuit; J. Harvie Wilkinson to the Fourth Circuit; Edith Jones to
the Fifth Circuit; Alex Kozinski to the Ninth Circuit; and Kenneth
68
Starr to the D.C. Circuit. All of these judges had close ties to the
69
Federalist Society.
IV. A REGRESSIVE APPLICATION OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT
DOCTRINE (1990S–2010S)
Although President Reagan left office in 1989, the right-wing
majority he created on the Supreme Court and the growing
Federalist Society influence over the lower courts escalated the
hostility toward the disparate impact doctrine. First, in Watson v.
70
71
Fort Worth Bank & Trust and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, the
Court modified the burden-shifting framework to make it easier for
72
employers to defend against disparate-impact claims. Second,
although Congress sought to preserve disparate-impact liability
through the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the largely toothless remedy
provided in that Act marked another victory for opponents of the
73
74
disparate impact doctrine. Third, as shown in Ricci v. DeStefano,
growing tensions between disparate-impact and reversediscrimination claims of disparate treatment impeded the ability to
truly remedy discrimination, especially discrimination resulting
75
76
from implicit bias. Fourth, Wal-Mart v. Dukes created unnecessary
and onerous obstacles to the effective prosecution of disparate77
impact claims. Each of these hurdles has decreased the viability of
disparate-impact claims in rectifying institutional discrimination
against protected classes. Eviscerating the disparate impact
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

AVERY & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 63, at 21–22.
Id. at 22.
Id.
487 U.S. 977 (1988).
490 U.S. 642 (1989).
See Watson, 487 U.S. at 998; Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656.
See infra Section IV.C.
557 U.S. 557, 578 (2009).
See infra Section IV.D.2.
564 U.S. 338 (2011).
See infra Section IV.E.
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doctrine in these ways has undermined its capacity to remedy more
fully the policies and practices that have caused or maintained
disparities based on a protected class, especially when the
discriminatory intent is not explicit.
A.

A Harbinger of the Legal Machinations to Come: Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust

The Supreme Court decided Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust
78
in 1988. In doing so, it planted the seeds for the ultimate
79
dismantling of the disparate impact doctrine as set forth in Griggs.
On its face, Watson appeared to strengthen the disparate impact
doctrine. Prior to Watson, the Court had not spoken as to whether
the disparate impact doctrine applied in cases where subjective
80
81
criteria were used in making employment decisions. The
82
majority in Watson held that employment practices that were
83
subjective could be analyzed under the disparate impact
84
This was an important development in antidoctrine.
78. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
79. While President Reagan’s election in 1981 has been credited with
beginning the retrenchment of the disparate impact doctrine because of his
appointment of right-wing Justices to the Supreme Courtwhich ultimately
resulted in the Wards Cove decision, known as the “civil rights massacre of
1989”it has also been noted that the Supreme Court began its attack on the
disparate impact doctrine as early as 1976 when it handed down the decision in
Washington v. Davis. See BELTON, supra note 22, at 268–70.
80. “Subjective criteria,” as opposed to “objective criteria,” refers to when an
employer allows a manager to use his discretion to decide, for example, who gets
hired or fired, or promoted or not promoted. See Anita M. Alessandra, Comment,
When Doctrines Collide: Disparate Treatment, Disparate Impact, and Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1755, 1763 (1989). Examples of subjective
criteria could include an employee’s confidence, friendliness, and attitude. Given
this subjectivity, managerial decisions could be based on subjective criteria that
may be the result of hidden biases or personal stereotypes. Id. at 1776.
81. Watson, 487 U.S. at 989.
82. A majority of the Court, seven members, agreed in Parts I, II-A, II-B, and
III of the opinion that in a Title VII action (1) “disparate impact analysis may be
applied to . . . subjective or discretionary” employment practices, and (2) certain
evidentiary standards applied. Id. at 977, 985–86.
83. Whereas subjective employment practices leave much discretion to a
manager, objective employment practices limit managerial discretion by basing
decisions on objective criteria, such as test scores, physical assessments, skills
measurements, training, education, and experience. Alessandra, supra note 80, at
1763.
84. Watson, 487 U.S. at 991.
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discrimination law because plaintiffs can now challenge subjective
85
employment practices under the disparate impact doctrine.
Watson was a hollow victory for plaintiffs, however, because the
86
plurality opinion constituted a harbinger for the deleterious
Wards Cove decision. The plurality “warned that the extension of
the disparate impact theory had the potential of undermining an
87
employer’s freedom to make legitimate business decisions.” The
plurality alleged that broadening the disparate impact doctrine to
subjective employment decisions may “increase the risk that
employers will be given incentives to adopt quotas or to engage in
88
preferential treatment.” Because of this risk, the plurality stated
that the current burden-shifting framework should be modified to
89
“serve as adequate safeguards” to prevent the risk.
According to the plurality, a plaintiff must provide statistical
evidence showing that a specific practice had a disparate impact on
90
a protected class to present a prima facie case of disparate impact.
Once a plaintiff presents a prima facie case, the burden of
production—not the burden of persuasion—shifts to the employer
to provide legitimate business reasons for the employment
91
practice. After that, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to assert
that there is a less discriminatory alternative employment practice
92
that can accomplish the employer’s legitimate business goals.
The detrimental part of the plurality opinion for the disparate
impact doctrine lay within the proposed burden-shifting framework
presented by the Court. “[T]he Court departed from past disparate
impact cases by affirming that the ultimate burden of proof
93
remain[ed], at all times, with the plaintiff.” Under this framework,

85. Merrill D. Feldstein, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust: Reallocating
the Burdens of Proof in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 919, 923
(1989).
86. The plurality opinion comprised Parts II-C and II-D of the opinion.
Justice O’Connor wrote the plurality opinion and was joined by Justices Rehnquist,
White, and Scalia. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 982.
87. Feldstein, supra note 85, at 940.
88. Watson, 487 U.S. at 993.
89. Id.
90. Feldstein, supra note 85, at 941.
91. Id. at 941–42.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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the employer never had the burden of persuasion, but merely a
94
burden of production.
Importantly, the burden-shifting framework conceived in
Watson would become outcome-determinative for plaintiffs. The
heavier burden of persuasion required the employer “to prove to
the fact finder the truth or existence of those facts for which the
95
party has the burden.” The lighter burden of production merely
required the employer to “produce evidence” that may or may not
96
be convincing. When the burden of production shifted to the
employer to provide a legitimate business reason, the employer
only needed to produce a reason of some sort; by contrast, the
burden of persuasion required the employer to prove the truth of
97
the reason offered. Accordingly, “although allocation of the
burdens of production and persuasion [was] nominally procedural,
it ha[d] significant, substantive impact” because “[t]he allocation
of the burdens between the parties [could] change the outcome of
98
the case.” Watson foreshadowed the heightened burden plaintiffs
now face after Wards Cove.
B.

The Purported Death Knell of Griggs: Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio

The disparate impact doctrine sustained a severe blow just one
year after the Watson decision in 1989 in the form of the Wards Cove
99
Packing Co. v. Atonio decision. Because there was no majority
opinion regarding the reallocation of the burden-shifting
requirements, the Watson decision created confusion about the
evidentiary burdens for a disparate-impact case. Wards Cove,
decided by the Court’s right-wing majority, severely weakened the
disparate impact doctrine as originally set out in Griggs by adopting
100
the new evidentiary approach outlined in Watson.
94. Id.
95. Candace S. Kovacic-Fleischer, Proving Discrimination After Price
Waterhouse and Wards Cove: Semantics as Substance, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 615, 620
(1990).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 621.
99. See 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
100. Compare id. at 656–60 (adopting the burden-shifting framework from
Watson that embraced a lighter burden of production, rather than persuasion),
with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (placing a heavier burden
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Under Wards Cove, the Court required the plaintiff to identify a
101
specific employment practice causing the disparate impact. Once
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the
burden of production rather than persuasion shifts to the employer to
102
articulate a “legitimate business reason” for the practice.
Ultimately, the plaintiff must rebut the employer’s legitimate
business reason by showing that an alternative practice would meet
the employer’s business reason as well as reduce the disparate
103
impact caused by the business practice being challenged.
The majority opinion emphasized that requiring an employer
to meet a higher burden than what Wards Cove created “would
104
result in a host of evils.” The majority also expressed concern that
a higher burden for employers would essentially compel the
105
adoption of affirmative action. One employment law professor
and commentator explained this concern: “[A]s the defendant’s
burden of proof becomes heavier, affirmative action becomes less
and less a voluntary option and more and more a mandatory
requirement. It becomes the only realistic way of avoiding liability
106
under the theory of disparate impact.”
The majority’s rationale, the proverbial “parade of horribles,”
does not turn on rigorous legal analysis or a full and fair
consideration of the factual reality across the nation. Instead, the

of persuasion on employers and stating that Congress placed the burden on the
employer to show that a practice has a manifest relationship to the employment in
question).
101. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657 (“As a general matter, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that it is the application of a specific or particular employment
practice that has created the disparate impact under attack.”); see also Kingsley R.
Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A “Quota Bill,” a Codification of Griggs, a Partial
Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 287, 303
(1993).
102. Browne, supra note 101, at 303.
103. Id.
104. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
105. See id. at 652 (“[A]ny employer who had a segment of his work force that
was—for some reason—racially imbalanced, could be haled into court and forced
to engage in the expensive and time-consuming task of defending the ‘business
necessity’ of the methods used to select the other members of his work force. The
only practicable option for many employers would be to adopt racial quotas,
insuring that no portion of their work forces deviated in racial composition from
the other portions thereof . . . .”)
106. GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 90 (3d ed.
2010).
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decision to change the evidentiary standard reflects a political and
economic judgment that employers and other defendants should
not be subjected to undue burden and legal exposure. Essentially—
and somewhat arbitrarily—the majority concluded that ensuring
true equality of opportunity is simply not important enough. Two
strong dissents to Wards Cove demonstrate this point by criticizing
the majority’s analysis, or lack thereof.
First, Justice John Paul Stevens observed that the majority’s
reliance on the Watson plurality opinion, which commentators have
criticized because it “relied on no authority whatsoever for its
107
108
proposition,” was “most disturbing.” Justice Stevens emphasized
that the divided Wards Cove opinion departed completely from the
Court’s unanimous decision in Griggs to prohibit neutral
109
employment practices with discriminatory effects.
In a separate and more pointed dissent, Justice Harry
Blackmun focused on the stark change in the judicial decisionmaking process used by the majority. Legal commentators have
noted that while the Court “once gave credence to the notion that
employment inequalities were, at least in part, the product of
previous racist employment practices” and “once took seriously its
110
own charge to eradicate the effects of past discrimination,” the
majority’s opinion did not. For instance, Justice Blackmun
questioned “whether the majority still believ[ed] that race
discrimination—or, more accurately, race discrimination against
nonwhites—[was] a problem in our society, or even remember[ed]
111
that it ever was.”
According to legal commentators, Justice
Blackmun concluded that the majority chose to “overlook racism”
and failed “to examine the history of segregation at the cannery in
112
Wards Cove.”
Not surprisingly, Wards Cove had a drastic effect on the effort
to remedy discriminatory employment practices. For instance,
Tyree Scott, a prominent workers’ rights activist, explained in plain
language the substantial adverse impact that Wards Cove and the

107. Amos N. Jones & D. Alexander Ewing, The Ghost of Wards Cove: The
Supreme Court, the Bush Administration, and the Ideology Undermining Title VII, 21
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 163, 169 (2005).
108. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 672 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 665–66.
110. Jones & Ewing, supra note 107, at 171.
111. Wards Cove, 490 U.S at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
112. Jones & Ewing, supra note 107, at 170.
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new burden-shifting framework had on civil rights enforcement
across the nation:
The burden was on the employees to prove harm. You
could allege a prima facie case of discrimination on the
basis of statistics. And then once you did that, it was on
the boss to prove that he wasn’t [discriminating]. So it was
very easy, you know, to start this cause of action, to go into
court . . . . [W]e had more than two dozen lawsuits filed in
six or seven cities . . . . And so when the law was good we
were winning . . . . The Wards Cove case . . . was really the
death throe to the ‘64 Civil Rights Act in terms of
113
employment.
In short, Wards Cove represented the culmination of judicial
extremism, which sought to eliminate the disparate impact
doctrine in furtherance of business interests. Wards Cove effectively
rolled back the gains in civil rights achieved through progressive
application of the disparate impact doctrine in the 1960s and
1970s. The courts’ subsequent and increasingly regressive approach
has thwarted application of the doctrine to areas beyond
employment discrimination. For example, the Supreme Court’s
114
holding in Alexander v. Sandoval has meant that “discrimination
claims can no longer be pursued under a disparate impact theory
in cases filed under Title VI, which applies to discrimination claims
115
regarding federally funded programs.”
C.

The Congressional Backlash Against Wards Cove: The Civil Rights
Act of 1991

In a telling display of the legislative intent behind Title VII,
Congress responded to the Wards Cove decision with the Civil
116
Rights Act of 1991. Congress viewed the Wards Cove decision as
113. Lovell, McCann & Taylor, supra note 48, at 61 (quoting Tyree Scott, a
workers’ rights activist).
114. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
115. Justin D. Cummins, The De Facto Death of Disparate Impact in Most Age
Discrimination Cases, CUMMINS & CUMMINS, LLP (Oct. 29, 2012),
https://www.cummins-law.com/blog/2012/10/the-defacto-death-of-disparate
-impact-in-most-age-discrimination-cases/.
116. The stated purposes of the amendment were: “(1) to provide appropriate
remedies for intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment in the
workplace; (2) to codify the concepts of ‘business necessity’ and ‘job related’
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
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undercutting the employment rights Congress sought to protect
when enacting Title VII. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 marked the
first time Congress expressly codified the disparate impact
117
doctrine. However, although the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is often
heralded as codifying Griggs, it only partially returned the disparate
impact doctrine to its state pre-Wards Cove.
Congress, through the Civil Rights Act of 1991, clarified its
intent by “correcting” the Supreme Court’s decision in Wards Cove
in several respects. Clarifying the law in several ways, the Act:
(1) Upheld the Wards Cove decision that plaintiffs must identify
a specific employment practice creating the disparate
impact, but provided an exception where if the plaintiff
could “demonstrate to the court that the elements of a
respondent’s decisionmaking process [were] not capable
of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may
118
be analyzed as one employment practice;”
(2) Required a higher burden of persuasion for an employer
trying to prove that a disparate impact was the result of a
119
“business necessity;”
(3) Defined “business necessity” as being “job related for the
position in question and consistent with business
120
necessity,” which narrowed judicial discretion to define
“business necessity”; and
(4) Changed the Wards Cove requirement that the plaintiff
121
establish the presence of a less-discriminatory alternative

490 U.S. 642 (1989); (3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory
guidelines for the adjudication of disparate impact suits under title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.); and, (4) to respond to recent
decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights
statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.” Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012)).
117. Eang L. Ngov, War and Peace Between Title VII’s Disparate Impact Provision
and the Equal Protection Clause: Battling for a Compelling Interest, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1,
14–15 (2010).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i).
119. See The Harvard Law Review Ass’n, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: The
Business Necessity Standard, 106 HARV. L. REV. 896, 913 (1993) (“[T]he defendantfriendly ‘legitimate business goals’ language in Wards Cove, as well as the broad
conception of ‘the job in question’ applied in that case . . . ought not be imported
into the definition of ‘business necessity’ under the Act.”).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
121. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 661.
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by requiring the alternative to be “equally” effective as the
122
challenged practice.
123
These changes did not usher in an era of more litigation. A
likely explanation is that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 allowed for
compensatory and punitive damages in Title VII claims, “but only
124
for claims of intentional discrimination.” With only equitable
remedies available for disparate-impact claims, bringing a case
remained cost-prohibitive for many plaintiffs because of the
challenging burden-shifting framework from Wards Cove and the
minimal monetary incentive for plaintiffs’ attorneys to pursue
125
disparate-impact claims. Without either a private attorney general
provision, providing sufficient capacity for plaintiffs’ attorneys to
bring suit, or the availability of punitive damages to compel
accountability, the Act did not provide a viable means of
enforcement.
Despite often being hailed as an affirmation of Griggs, the
reality remains that many elements of Wards Cove have remained
intact after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. As a result, “it is
not at all clear that the disparate-impact provisions of the 1991 Act
126
Notwithstanding the
have delivered their promised victory.”
monetary issue of remedies, plaintiffs bringing disparate impact
claims post–Civil Rights Act of 1991 must identify a specific
employment practice in order to establish a prima facie disparate127
impact case. This new requirement has proven fatal to many
claims. In Clark v. Eagle Food Centers, for example, an employee
alleged that her employer’s promotion practices had a disparate
impact on women and had statistical evidence to support a

122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). This change allowed the employee to
rebut the employer’s showing of business necessity and job relatedness by showing
that (1) an alternative practice exists that produces less of a disparate impact and
(2) the employer refuses to adopt that alternative employment practice. See
Browne, supra note 101, at 371–72.
123. See Melissa Hart, From Wards Cove to Ricci: Struggling Against the “Built-in
Headwinds” of a Skeptical Court, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261, 271 (2011) (“[T]here
was no surge in the number of disparate impact suits filed after 1991.”).
124. Id.
125. Id. However, it has also been suggested that the reduction in disparateimpact cases after 1991 is because the disparate impact doctrine was effective in
fulfilling its purpose of “encourag[ing] employers to develop internal practices
that did not have a disparate impact on protected classes.” Id.
126. Id. at 261.
127. Id. at 267.
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disparate-impact claim, but the court still dismissed the plaintiff’s
claim because she could not isolate to the court’s satisfaction the
128
specific practice creating the disparate impact.
D.

The Manufactured Tension Between the Disparate Impact and
Disparate Treatment Theories of Liability
1.

Pitting the Disparate Impact Theory Against the Disparate
Treatment Theory: Ricci v. DeStefano

The regressive attack on the disparate impact doctrine reached
new heights in 2009 when the Supreme Court decided Ricci v.
129
DeStefano. This case most clearly exemplifies the judicial activism
of the Court’s right-wing majority. Although Ricci concerned
disparate treatment, the majority reached beyond to decide
questions about the constitutionality of the disparate impact
130
doctrine. Indeed, the majority used Ricci to exploit the supposed
tension between the disparate impact and disparate treatment
theories as a rationale for further attacking the disparate impact
131
doctrine.
The facts of Ricci involved a promotion examination in the City
132
of New Haven. The results of the examination showed a disparate
133
impact on candidates of color. The City decided not to use the
results of the promotion examination to avoid Title VII liability
134
under the disparate impact doctrine. The Supreme Court held,

128. Clark v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., No. 95-3459, 1997 WL 6145, at *1 (8th
Cir. Jan. 9, 1997) (“Clark did not identify a specific employment practice that
caused this statistical disparity; rather, she simply restated her disparate treatment
allegations that Eagle pursued intentionally discriminatory policies against women
in training and promotion opportunities.”).
129. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
130. Id. at 584.
131. Id. at 558 (“The question, therefore, is whether the purpose to avoid
disparate-impact liability excuses what otherwise would be prohibited disparatetreatment discrimination.”). Interpreting these doctrines in opposition to each
other is troubling for the future of the disparate impact doctrine because it
circumvents the purpose and policy behind Title VII and the disparate impact
doctrine by dissuading employers from taking necessary preventative measures to
eradicate systemic discrimination and makes it impossible for the disparate impact
doctrine to operate as it was intended.
132. Id. at 557.
133. Id. at 562.
134. Id.
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however, that the City of New Haven intentionally discriminated
against the white firefighters when it decided not to use the results
of the promotion examination, given the disparate impact of using
135
those results. In its analysis, the majority considered whether the
City met its burden in proving that preventing disparate impact on
candidates of color was an adequate defense for “intentional
136
discrimination.”
To determine whether the City met its burden, the Court first
had to decide what evidentiary standard applied. The majority
137
and applied
relied on Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education
138
Wygant’s “strong-basis-in-evidence-standard.” The Ricci court held
that the City did not have a strong basis in evidence to conclude
that the promotional examination was ineffective or, furthermore,
to abandon the test scores in avoidance of disparate-impact
139
liability.
The majority held that a prima facie showing of a statistical
disparity was not enough to demonstrate the City would be liable
140
for disparate impact. It determined that “before an employer can
engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of
avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the
employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be
subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race141
conscious, discriminatory action.” The majority emphasized that
the City could only be liable for disparate impact if (1) the City
could not show that its examinations were job-related and
consistent with a business necessity, or (2) the City could not
overcome less-discriminatory alternatives available to the City to
142
meet its objective. Because the City did not meet this threshold,
135. Id. at 563.
136. Id. at 579.
137. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
138. Id. at 277–78 (“The trial court must make a factual determination that
the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action
was necessary. The ultimate burden remains with the employees to demonstrate
the unconstitutionality of an affirmative-action program. But unless such a
determination is made, an appellate court reviewing a challenge by nonminority
employees to remedial action cannot determine whether the race-based action is
justified as a remedy for prior discrimination.”).
139. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 593 (2009).
140. Id. at 587.
141. Id. at 585.
142. Id. at 587.
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the majority held that preventing disparate-impact liability in this
case did not defeat the disparate-treatment claims.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia signaled the imminent
escalation of the attack on the disparate impact doctrine. Justice
Scalia declared as follows: “The Court’s resolution of these cases
makes it unnecessary to resolve these matters today. But the war
between disparate impact and equal protection will be waged
143
sooner or later.”
2.

The Problem of Implicit Bias and Unconscious Discrimination
After Ricci

As overt discrimination has become less prevalent in the
workplace, the spotlight on unconscious discrimination or implicit
bias, “characterized by a subconscious decisionmaking process
based on intuition and a lack of an overt intent to discriminate,”
144
has become more prominent. What social scientists have deemed
“implicit bias” has drawn great attention to how people look at
145
discrimination in modern times. “Implicit biases are defined as
the subconscious attitudes, feelings, and stereotypes that an
146
individual may possess toward a given social group,” which are
“assimilated through interactions with others and an individual’s
147
culture, and are picked up throughout an individual’s lifetime.”
However, “most individuals are entirely unaware that they possess
148
any implicit biases.”
Implicit bias is a growing concern in the employment context
in particular. The “workplace has shifted away from the rigid and
linear systems of the past, which has enhanced the impact of
149
implicit biases on the employment decisionmaking process.”
Moreover, modern workplaces tend to require individuals to “make
quick decisions that are largely based on intuition” and require
employers to “rely on subjective characteristics to evaluate their
150
employees.” Where much discretion is given to an employer, an
143. Id. at 595–96.
144. Id.
145. Christopher Cerullo, Everyone’s a Little Bit Racist? Reconciling Implicit Bias
and Title VII, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 127, 127 (2013).
146. Id. at 138.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 139.
150. Id. at 140.
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employee becomes more vulnerable to the deleterious effect of
151
implicit bias, which may lead to unconscious discrimination.
Although such discrimination may be unintentional, the result
would be effectively the same as explicitly intentional
152
In other words, implicit bias can lead to a
discrimination.
disparate impact.
In this context, the question becomes whether an employer
can acknowledge implicit bias and remedy systemically
discriminatory practices without disparate treatment—that is,
without engaging in intentional discrimination. The majority in
Ricci created a false choice between rectifying institutional
153
discrimination and avoiding disparate treatment. In truth, the
purported victims of supposed disparate treatment are
beneficiaries of systemic discrimination in their favor, so the
disparate impact doctrine acts as a corrective mechanism to make
the playing field more level for everyone. Application of the
disparate impact doctrine, then, remedies rather than perpetuates
discrimination.
In sum, a systemic approach that considers outcomes of
policies and practices—regardless of how well-intentioned the
policies and practices may be—is necessary to achieve the equality
of opportunity that the legislative branch has recognized to be
axiomatic. “Congress . . . cast the [employment and civil rights]
plaintiff in the role of a ‘private attorney general,’ vindicating a
154
policy ‘of the highest priority.’” Similarly, the Minnesota Human
Rights Act declares that “discrimination threatens the rights and
privileges of the inhabitants of this state and menaces the
155
In light of the
institutions and foundations of democracy.”
institutional nature of discrimination and the reality of implicit bias
in decision-making, the disparate impact doctrine remains essential
to eradicating discrimination based on a protected class as both
Congress and the Supreme Court have previously mandated.

151. Id. at 158.
152. Id.
153. Cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 629 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
154. N.Y. Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63 (1980) (emphasis
added) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416–17
(1978)).
155. MINN. STAT. § 363A.02, subdiv. 1(b) (2016) (emphasis added).
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The Core Impediments to Class Action Certification of DisparateImpact Claims
1.

The Practical Nexus Between Disparate-Impact Claims and Class
Actions

Class actions facilitate more robust enforcement activity
regarding systemic violations because they enable plaintiffs to pool
resources and shared experience in prosecuting civil rights
156
Because class actions allow the financial burden of
claims.
attorney’s fees and litigation costs to be divided amongst a larger
number of claimants, it is “economically possible to assert
157
[claims].” As a result, class actions work to “eliminate power
imbalances” that exist between individual plaintiffs and large
158
corporate defendants.
In addition to equalizing the differences in resources between
parties, class actions help to equalize the comparative power in
litigation because an individual plaintiff may have substantial
“emotional apprehension” and “fear of retaliation by an employer”
159
if proceeding by himself or herself. In other words, class actions
operate to provide strength in numbers, which helps to “motivate
160
and inspire confidence in individual class members.”
Because discrimination takes its toll on a particular group
based on a particular characteristic, it makes sense that groupbased litigation strategies should be used. Indeed, by its very
nature, “[e]vidence of disproportionate impact inevitably is
evidence that an entire class has suffered from a violation of Title
161
VII.” Furthermore, the word “discrimination” connotes groupbased action; specifically, it can be described as “the practice of

156. 97 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 81 Litigating an Employment Discrimination
Class Action § 5 (2007).
157. Id.
158. Katie Melnick, In Defense of the Class Action Lawsuit: An Examination of the
Implicit Advantages and a Response to Common Criticisms, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL
COMMENT 755, 790 (2008).
159. Sherry E. Clegg, Employment Discrimination Class Actions: Why Plaintiffs
Must Cover All Their Bases After the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a)(2) in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 44 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1087, 1094 (2012).
160. Id. at 1095.
161. George Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 688, 712–13
(1980).
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unfairly treating a person or group of people differently from other
162
people or groups of people.”
Courts have also pointed to the practical nexus between
disparate impact and class actions pre- and post-Griggs. In 1960—
before Griggs—the Seventh Circuit held in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive
Co. that a “suit for violation of Title VII is necessarily a class action
as the evil sought to be ended is discrimination on the basis of a
163
class characteristic, i.e. race, sex, religion or national origin.”
Moreover, in 1982—after Griggs—the United States Supreme Court
reasoned that it “[could not] disagree with the proposition
underlying the across-the-board rule—that racial discrimination is
164
by definition class discrimination.”
Consequently, employment discrimination cases pursued via
165
the disparate impact doctrine are generally class actions, and they
166
While individuals can pursue
are most successful as such.
167
disparate-impact claims, they are often unsuccessful. These claims
are difficult for individual plaintiffs because of the “evidentiary
rigors of a disparate-impact claim, consisting of aggregate statistics
showing that an employer’s facially neutral practice had a
168
disproportionately adverse impact on a protected group.”
Producing necessary statistics is a lengthy process requiring
“extensive discovery and expert testimony, which individual
169
plaintiffs commonly fail to do.”

162. Discrimination, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/discrimination (last visited Sept. 22, 2016) (defining discrimination as
“the practice of unfairly treating a person or group of people differently from
other people or groups of people”).
163. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969).
164. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982).
165. James S. Bryan, Shifting the Burdens in Disparate Impact Cases: Wards Cove
Packing v. Atonio, 6 LAB. LAW. 233, 235 (1990).
166. See Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing a Barren Vault: The Implications of Dukes v.
Wal-Mart for Cases Challenging Subjective Employment Practices, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L. J. 433, 443 (2012).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 444.
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The Culmination of the Ideologically Driven Attack on the
Disparate Impact Doctrine and Class Actions: Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes

Despite the practical nexus between disparate-impact claims
and class action claims, the recent decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes, a massive class action involving over 1.5 million plaintiffs,
created new hurdles for those seeking to eradicate
170
discrimination.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
plaintiffs must satisfy four prerequisites before a class may be
171
172
certified : “numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy.”
173
The issue in Wal-Mart involved the commonality requirement.
Prior to Wal-Mart, the commonality requirement had “been seen as
relatively easy to satisfy” and required simply that “each member of
the class assert claims that share[d] legal or factual issues with one
174
another.”
In Wal-Mart, however, the majority required a heightened
commonality standard. Under Wal-Mart, members of a class have to
“suffer[] the same injury,” not just “a violation of the same
175
provision of law.” To support this heightened standard, the
majority argued that Wal-Mart’s policy of delegating pay and
promotion decisions to local manager discretion based on
subjective factors was not sufficient to meet the commonality
176
requirement under Rule 23. The majority declared that “the
mere claim by employees of the same company that they have Title
VII injury, or even a disparate-impact Title VII injury, gives no
cause to believe that all their claims can productively be litigated at
177
once.” Instead, the majority held the following:

170. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011).
171. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (“Prerequisites. One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1)
the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”).
172. Tippett, supra note 166, at 444.
173. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 349 (“The crux of this case is commonality.”).
174. A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining
Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 443 (2013).
175. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350.
176. See id. at 352.
177. Id. at 350.
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[The plaintiffs’ claims] must depend upon a common
contention—for example, the assertion of discriminatory
bias on the part of the same supervisor. That common
contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is
capable of classwide resolution—which means that
determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue
that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in
178
one stroke.
Not surprisingly, under this onerous new standard, the
majority found that the plaintiffs in Wal-Mart failed to show they
179
had sufficient commonality to certify a class. Otherwise stated,
Wal-Mart “raise[d] the bar for plaintiffs seeking to certify large class
actions involving disparately situated individuals and provide[d]
class-action defendants with a variety of tools to defeat such
180
efforts.”
The majority opinion in Wal-Mart represents yet another
setback for the disparate impact doctrine, in particular, and civil
rights enforcement, in general. The disparate impact doctrine,
especially when used in the prosecution of class actions, is
potentially one of the most powerful means of challenging
corporate power that perpetuates—and even profits from—
discrimination-induced inequality. In particular, class-based
discovery and the fee-shifting mechanism under civil rights statutes
collectively enable the proverbial David to have a chance at
prevailing over the proverbial Goliath. Wal-Mart undermines the
ability of future litigants to use collective action to challenge
discriminatory practices for protected classes in this manner.

178. Id.
179. Id. at 359.
180. Grace E. Speights & Paul C. Evans, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Supreme Court
Announces Stricter Class-Certification Standards, WESTLAW J. EXPERT SCI. EVIDENCE,
Dec. 20, 2011, at 12, 2011 WL 6367678, at *1; see Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 360
(holding unanimously that claims for monetary relief may not be certified as a
class action under Rule 23(b)(2)); see also Speights & Evans, supra, at *3 (“This
ruling has widespread implications for class actions because Rule 23(b)(3)
requires plaintiffs to prove that common questions predominate over individual
ones and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy. Given the court’s cynicism regarding the
use of discretionary decision making as grounds for the less-stringent commonality
standard, this burden should be extremely difficult for plaintiffs’ attorneys to meet
in employment class actions without significantly altering the types of class actions
they bring.”).
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Wal-Mart, like Wards Cove, reflects political and economic
judgments—shaped primarily by the ideologically-driven Federalist
Society—regarding what is “best,” rather than a principled analysis
of how to apply the compelling public policy codified by the
governing civil rights statutes. In other words, the majority in WalMart placed corporate interests before the public interest—
prioritizing the preservation of company profits over fulfilment of
181
the constitutional promise of equality for all.
F.

The Obvious Consequence of a Regressive Application of the Disparate
Impact Doctrine: Continued Disparities Based on a Protected Class

Beginning in the 1980s, largely ideologically-driven courts
began to distort the disparate impact doctrine adopted in Griggs.
Recent applications of the disparate impact doctrine deviated
radically from Griggs, which sought to establish a viable claim for
182
“practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”
Whereas the Supreme Court in Albemarle operationalized the
doctrine by placing a greater burden of proof on the defendant,

181. Wal-Mart espouses the same prioritization of corporate interests over the
public interest illustrated by Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S.
310 (2010). Both Citizens United and the follow-up McCutcheon v. Federal Election
Commission, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014), collectively stand for the proposition that
corporations and billionaires should be allowed to inject as much money into the
electoral process as they want because that somehow constitutes “free speech” and
promotes democracy. The practical reality, of course, is that the speech of
corporations and billionaires drowns out the speech of regular people. The de
facto quid pro quo of massive campaign contributions for policy changes
undermines democracy.
Although many declare that the United States is a democracy, a recent
empirical study by Princeton economists determined that our form of government
is actually most like an oligarchy. See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing
Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12
PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 564, 577 (2014) (“Americans do enjoy many features central
to democratic governance, such as regular elections, freedom of speech and
association, and a widespread (if still contested) franchise. But we believe that if
policymaking is dominated by powerful business organizations and a small
number of affluent Americans, then America’s claims to being a democratic
society are seriously threatened.”). An oligarchy is characterized by a “small group
of people” or interests that control a country. Oligarchy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/oligarchy (last visited Sept. 22,
2016).
182. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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183

rather than on the plaintiff, the Court, channeling the Federalist
Society agenda, has since perverted the doctrine’s purpose of
eliminating discrimination against protected classes, whether the
discrimination was intentional or not.
Just as Wards Cove, Ricci, and Wal-Mart have seriously limited
the power of disparate-impact claims under Title VII, the Supreme
Court has used other decisions to restrict or even eliminate
disparate-impact claims under other civil rights statutes. Sandoval,
discussed above, actually nullified the disparate impact doctrine
184
The
under Title VI regarding federally funded programs.
Supreme Court limited disparate impact’s viability under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) in a 2005 decision,
185
Smith v. City of Jackson.
In Smith, the Court recognized disparate impact as a
186
In doing so, the Court
cognizable claim under the ADEA.
recognized similarities between the ADEA and Title VII. The Court
noted that the Griggs court “interpreted the identical text at
187
issue” in Smith and, thus, “[t]he language and circumstances
surrounding the passage of both Acts indicated that they should be
188
interpreted similarly.”
Nonetheless, the majority in Smith departed from Griggs by
applying a diluted version of the disparate impact doctrine for
189
ADEA claims. In Griggs, the Court held that a practice resulting in
183. See BELTON, supra note 22, at 196–97.
184. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
185. See 544 U.S. 228, 243 (2005).
186. See id. at 239. The ADEA was passed in 1967 and its intended purposes
were “to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than
age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help
employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of
age on employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2012).
187. Smith, 544 U.S. at 236.
188. Debra Burke, ADEA Disparate Impact Discrimination: A Pyrrhic Victory?, 9
U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 47, 57 (2008).
189. It is worth noting that the Court revisited its Smith holding in Meacham v.
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory in 2008. See 554 U.S. 84, 95 (2008). The Smith case
left it unclear whether the burden for showing an RFOA (reasonable factor other
than age) rested with the employee or the employer. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 228.
The Meacham Court held “an employer facing a disparate-impact claim and
planning to defend on the basis of RFOA must not only produce evidence raising
the defense, but also persuade the factfinder of its merit.” 554 U.S. at 87; see Burke,
supra note 188, at 75. Despite doing so, “the Court recognized that the difference
in the burden of proof applied to the facts may not translate into a difference in
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a disparate impact violates the law unless the employer can show
the practice is related to job performance. Griggs emphasized that
190
“[t]he touchstone is business necessity.” The majority in Smith
held, however, that the employer can rebut the prima facie case of
disparate impact for older workers “if it can establish that the policy
is based upon a reasonable factor other than age—a rather
191
undemanding burden.” The majority also concluded that the
RFOA (reasonable factor other than age) showing only requires
the employer to “meet a reasonableness test; there is no inquiry
concerning whether there is a better way to achieve a goal,” which
192
is “an inquiry required under business necessity.” The result for
193
plaintiffs is “a difficult, if not impossible, burden of proof,”
because they have to prove that the “employer’s proffered
rationalization of the allegedly discriminatory practice or policy is
unreasonable, either in the prima facie case or in rebuttal to an
194
affirmative defense.”
In effect, Smith allows employers to
“promulgate whatever policy they choose, providing it makes some
degree of sense, notwithstanding its impact on protected
employees,” and represents another example of how the Court has
195
skewed disparate impact doctrine analysis. Rather than seeking to
prevent discrimination against protected classes, regressive
application of the doctrine protects business interests and props up
the powerful at the expense of equal opportunity and the public
interest.
The seemingly abstract issues about burdens of proof have
concrete consequences. Statistics reflect ongoing and intensifying
disparities in the context of the anemic application of the disparate
196
impact doctrine. A recent study found that it would take 228
years to close the wealth gap between African American and white
the result.” Burke, supra note 188, at 76.
190. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
191. Burke, supra note 188, at 59–60.
192. Ann Marie Tracey & Norma Skoog, Is Business Judgment a Catch-22 for
ADEA Plaintiffs? The Impact of Smith v. City of Jackson on Future ADEA Employment
Litigation, 33 DAYTON L. REV. 231, 255 (2008).
193. Burke, supra note 188, at 69–70.
194. Id. at 70.
195. Id. at 82.
196. See, e.g., Kate Davidson, It Would Take 228 Years for Black Families to Amass
Wealth of White Families, Analysis Says, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2016, 7:12 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2016/08/09/it-would-take-228-years-for-black
-families-to-amass-wealth-of-white-families-analysis-says/.
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197

families. Also, by way of example, “only 24 percent of CEOs in the
US were women and they earned 74.5 percent as much as male
198
CEOs.” The statistics illustrate that disparities reach far beyond
199
employment access and into educational access,
heath care
200
201
access, access to quality and affordable housing, and financial
202
access for economic security.
The widespread presence of these disparities within a large
number of systems of opportunity demonstrates the pervasiveness
of unconscious and institutionalized discrimination, which requires
a systematic approach to fully remedy past and ongoing harm. The
disparate treatment theory, which relies on the evidence of overt
discrimination to prove explicit intent, is not an effective tool for
addressing the persistent and intensifying disparities experienced
by members of protected classes.

197. Id.
198. Gender Inequality and Women in the U.S. Labor Force, INT’L LABOUR ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/washington/areas/gender-equality-in-the-workplace/WCMS
_159496/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2016) (describing the ongoing
presence of gender pay gaps and disparities in the number of women in
leadership positions in corporations).
199. Saeed Ahmed, Racial Disparities Persist in U.S. Schools, Study Finds, CNN
(June 27, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/07/health/schools-disparity
-education-study/ (indicating ongoing racial disparities in education).
200. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., 2014 NATIONAL HEALTHCARE QUALITY & DISPARITIES REPORT 2 (May 2015),
https://www.ahrq.gov/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/research/findings/nhqrdr
/nhqdr14/2014nhqdr.pdf (indicating research suggests disparities in healthcare
access).
201. Gregory D. Squires & Charis E. Kubrin, Privileged Places: Race, Opportunity
and Uneven Development in Urban America, SHELTERFORCE ONLINE (Fall 2006),
http://nhi.org/online/issues/147/privilegedplaces.html (“Seventy percent of
white families own their homes; approximately half of black families do so. For
blacks, home equity accounts for two-thirds of their assets compared with two-fifths
for whites. A study of the 100 largest metropolitan areas found that black
homeowners received 18 percent less value for their investments in their homes
than white homeowners.”).
202. For example, “[i]n the Milwaukee metropolitan area, while AfricanAmericans represent 16% of the population they only received 4% of mortgage
loans. Similarly, African-Americans make up 18% of the population in the St.
Louis metropolitan area but only had 4% of all home loans made there.” Jacob
Passy, Racial Disparities Seen in Loan Data for Three MSAs: Report, NAT’L MORTGAGE
NEWS (July 20, 2016), http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/news/origination
/racial-disparities-seen-in-loan-data-for-three-msas-report-1082644-1.html.
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Recent movements, such as Occupy Wall Street and Black
Lives Matter, demonstrate an increasing recognition that the
system needs to be changed because it disadvantages members of
protected classes as a matter of course, if not by design. “Occupy’s
fundamental message—that the financial and political systems is
rigged in favor of the 1%—has gained ground over the past five
203
years.” Likewise, the Black Lives Matter movement has raised
204
Robust
awareness about discriminatory legal systems.
enforcement of civil rights statutes via a meaningful and
progressive application of the disparate impact doctrine is crucial
to avert the potential political, social, and economic repercussions
that evidently will flow from refusal to change the status quo in
furtherance of equalizing opportunity.
V. ENVISIONING A MORE MEANINGFUL APPLICATION OF THE
DISPARATE IMPACT DOCTRINE
Although much of the jurisprudence concerning the disparate
impact doctrine has developed under Title VII to address
workplace discrimination, the doctrine has also been used under
205
Title VIII to address housing discrimination.
In 2015, the
Supreme Court revisited the disparate impact doctrine under Title
VIII in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive
206
Communities Project, Inc. in a manner that offers hope for the
future.
A.

The Explicit Recognition of the Need to Remedy “Unconscious
Prejudice”: Texas Department of Housing and Community
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.

Against the trend of applying the disparate impact doctrine in
a regressive way, the Supreme Court embraced an expansive
interpretation of the doctrine in Inclusive Communities. Specifically,
the Court recognized that disparate impact is a cognizable claim
203. Ben Geier, The Occupy Movement Comes of Age, FORTUNE (May 24, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/05/24/the-occupy-movement-comes-of-age/.
204. See, e.g., Robert King, Black Lives Matter Holds White House Protest, WASH.
EXAMINER (July 8, 2016), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/black-lives-matter
-holds-white-house-protest/article/2596042 (discussing legal discrimination).
205. See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
206. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
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207

under Title VIII, the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”). In doing so, the
Court analyzed Title VII and the ADEA, the two anti-discrimination
208
statutes that preceded the FHA. The Court decided that the logic
of Griggs and Smith provided “strong support for the conclusion
209
that the FHA [supports] disparate-impact claims.”
This
conclusion, paired with statutory analysis of the results-oriented
policies of the FHA, prompted the Court formally to adopt the
210
disparate impact doctrine under the FHA.
Importantly, the language of the Court’s decision in Inclusive
Communities suggests a shift in how the Court views the disparate
impact doctrine. The author of the decision, Justice Anthony
Kennedy, concluded by writing that the Court “acknowledges the
Fair Housing Act’s continuing role in moving the nation toward a
211
more integrated society.” Justice Kennedy’s language further
embraced the insight and reasoning of Griggs when he wrote the
following vital words: “Recognition of disparate-impact liability
under the FHA plays an important role in uncovering
discriminatory intent: it permits plaintiffs to counteract
unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy
212
Given the Court’s
classification as disparate treatment.”
acknowledgement of “unconscious prejudices” leading to disparate
213
impacts,
Inclusive Communities marks a crucial return to a
progressive application of the disparate impact doctrine.

207.
208.
209.
210.

See id. at 2525.
See id. at 2516–18.
Id. at 2518.
See Justin D. Cummins, Fair Housing Protections Remain Robust, CUMMINS &
CUMMINS, LLP (July 2, 2015), https://www.cummins-law.com/blog/2015/07/fair
-housing-protections-remain-robust/ (Congress “enacted the Fair Housing Act
pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which abolished
slavery,” and its passage sought to achieve a more integrated society that departed
from the segregation of housing, which “means the segregation of schools and
other institutions . . . all of which [are] vestige[s] of slavery according to
Congress.”).
211. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2525–26.
212. Id. at 2511–12.
213. Id.
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The Mandate for a Systematic Approach to Remedy Continuing
Disparities: A Return to a Progressive Application of the Disparate
Impact Doctrine

For the disparate impact doctrine to be meaningful and for
the nation to have any chance of truly eliminating discrimination,
courts should do the following to restore analytical integrity to the
legal regime: (1) re-impose a burden of persuasion, rather than
merely a burden of production, on defendants before they can shift
the evidentiary burden back to plaintiffs in disparate-impact cases;
(2) make explicit the fee-shifting mechanism that enables plaintiffs’
counsel to serve as private attorneys general in disparate-impact
claims; (3) certify class actions in disparate-impact cases; and (4)
reject defendants’ efforts to pit disparate impact against disparate
treatment theories of liability.
In addition to restoring vitality to the disparate impact
doctrine that existed in the 1960s and 1970s, the courts should
draw upon more recent insights to make the doctrine as relevant
and effective as possible in the twenty-first century. In particular,
courts would do well to consider evidence of both disproportionate
advantage and disproportionate disadvantage as proof of a
214
disparate-impact claim. In other words, and given the subtle
forms that discrimination often takes now, courts need to look at
both sides of the equation for evidence of a civil rights violation.
Reframing the disparate impact doctrine to provide not only a
remedy for subordination, but also a remedy for privilege, “would
empower courts to identify and remedy . . . more discrimination
because . . . discrimination can manifest itself as either privilege or
215
subordination, not just subordination.” To exemplify this idea,
consider the following: “[I]f whites receive benefits—jobs,
promotions, contracts, housing opportunities, or loans—to an
extent substantially exceeding their numbers within the pool of
prospective recipients or applicants, people of color would have the
216
evidentiary basis for a cause of action.”
214. See Justin D. Cummins, Refashioning the Disparate Treatment and Disparate
Impact Doctrines in Theory and in Practice, 41 HOW. L.J. 455, 477 (1998) (“Not only
does anti-discrimination law fail to remedy adequately racial subordination, it also
completely ignores . . . privilege, all in the quest to preserve formal equality.
Consequently, anti-discrimination law, as dictated by the current disparate
treatment and disparate impact doctrines, preserves the . . . status quo.”).
215. Id. at 476.
216. Id. at 472–73.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, challenging discriminatory practices under a
disparate treatment theory of liability has not even come close to
eliminating discrimination in the United States. In the employment
arena and elsewhere, courts effectively enabled companies and
other defendants to explain away discriminatory practices by
217
alleging that there was no intent to discriminate, even as the
218
disparities based on a protected class widened.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court adopted the disparate impact
doctrine to hold businesses and other defendants accountable for
facially neutral practices that privilege one group of employees at
219
the expense of members of a protected class. A progressive
application of the disparate impact doctrine yielded highly positive
results around the country until the 1980s, when political change
empowered right-wing legal activists and judges to impose a
220
regressive application of the doctrine. Since then, the disparities
based on protected classes have increased substantially and
221
unsurprisingly.
The growing awareness of implicit bias offers great promise,
even as the efforts to dismantle the disparate impact doctrine have
continued. During its last term, the Supreme Court expressly
acknowledged the existence of, and the need to remedy,
unconscious discrimination in the context of emphasizing the
222
disparate impact doctrine’s value. At a more practical level, the
enhanced understanding of implicit bias has prompted corporate
leaders, such as Facebook, Coca-Cola, and Google, and government
agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, to provide
implicit bias trainings while addressing unconscious discrimination
223
within their institutions.
These important developments signal the return to a
progressive application of the disparate impact doctrine. To that
217. See supra Section IV.B.
218. See supra Section IV.F.
219. See supra Section II.B.
220. See supra Part III.
221. See supra Section IV.F.
222. See supra Section V.A.
223. See Valentina Zarya, I Failed This Test on Racism and Sexism—and So Will
You, FORTUNE (Nov. 10, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/11/10/test-racism
-sexism-unconscious-bias/ (discussing the increasing organizational use of
unconscious bias training as a response to implicit bias).
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end, courts should follow the recommendations set forth above in
Section V.B. In so doing, the judiciary can help fulfill the
constitutional promise of equal opportunity for all. Such an
approach will not only promote the rule of law, it will also help to
224
“form a more perfect Union.”

224.
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